{
  "id": "nexus-sen-1-1011-892304",
  "citation": "Res. 00001-2018 Tribunal de Casación Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda",
  "section": "nexus_decisions",
  "doc_type": "court_decision",
  "title_es": "Rechazo parcial de casación por informalidad procesal",
  "title_en": "Partial dismissal of cassation for procedural informality",
  "summary_es": "El Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda admite parcialmente el recurso de casación interpuesto por Químicos Holanda Costa Rica S.A. contra sentencia de la Sección Octava, pero rechaza de plano los dos motivos fundados en violación de normas procesales. La empresa alegó indefensión y falta de motivación porque el tribunal de instancia citó los artículos 340 de la LGAP y 98 de la LOA sin analizarlos, pero el órgano casacional considera ambos reproches informales: el recurrente no explicó cómo se configuró el perjuicio ni identificó los fundamentos de la sentencia que no pudo combatir, incumpliendo la técnica propia de la casación. Los tres cargos sustantivos sí se admiten y se da traslado al Estado por diez días hábiles.",
  "summary_en": "The Contentious-Administrative Cassation Court partially admits the cassation appeal filed by Químicos Holanda Costa Rica S.A. against a judgment of the Eighth Section, but flatly dismisses the two grounds based on violation of procedural rules. The company alleged defenselessness and lack of reasoning because the lower court cited articles 340 of the LGAP and 98 of the LOA without analyzing them, but the cassation court considers both objections informal: the appellant did not explain how the harm materialized or which parts of the judgment it could not contest, failing to meet the proper cassation technique. The three substantive grounds are admitted and the State is granted ten business days to respond.",
  "court_or_agency": "Tribunal de Casación Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda",
  "date": "2018",
  "year": "2018",
  "topic_ids": [
    "_off-topic"
  ],
  "primary_topic_id": "_off-topic",
  "es_concept_hints": [
    "casación",
    "rechazo de plano",
    "informalidad",
    "indefensión",
    "falta de motivación",
    "técnica casacional",
    "LGAP",
    "LOA"
  ],
  "concept_anchors": [
    {
      "article": "Art. 340",
      "law": "Ley General de la Administración Pública"
    },
    {
      "article": "Art. 98",
      "law": "Ley Orgánica del Ambiente"
    }
  ],
  "keywords_es": [
    "casación",
    "rechazo de plano",
    "informalidad procesal",
    "indefensión",
    "falta de motivación",
    "técnica casacional",
    "LGAP 340",
    "LOA 98",
    "daño ambiental",
    "Químicos Holanda"
  ],
  "keywords_en": [
    "cassation",
    "flat dismissal",
    "procedural informality",
    "defenselessness",
    "lack of reasoning",
    "cassation technique",
    "LGAP 340",
    "LOA 98",
    "environmental damage",
    "Químicos Holanda"
  ],
  "excerpt_es": "Analizados los anteriores planteamientos, se observa que el casacionista no respeta, al menos en cuanto a estas censuras, las reglas que es menester acatar a la hora de interponer un recurso extraordinario de casación. No basta en esta etapa procesal, expresar una serie de yerros, también es necesario indicar, la forma cómo este se presentó. Debe hacerse la indicación que el recurso de la parte demandante no respeta la técnica que ha de imperar en este tipo de impugnaciones, no puede pretender que se analicen sus cargos con simples manifestaciones de lo que estima es una indefensión y falta de motivación, sin ahondar en los motivos, como si se tratare de una apelación; y menos aún que se revisen todos esos temas, sin que se explique con detalle cómo se dio el perjuicio. Es decir, sin que se haya analizado a detalle, por qué es perjudicado y cómo se presentó la inobservancia de la norma procesal. Así las cosas, en el primer motivo, no explica ni identifica qué parte o consideraciones de la sentencia no pudo combatir, cuales hechos o argumentos de los Jueces le causaron esa indefensión; lo cual tampoco se entiende o es contradictorio, cuando de forma clara y amplia expone su agravio por indebida aplicación e interpretación de aquellas normas 340 de la LGAP y 98 de la LOA. En otras palabras, no explica en qué consiste el agravio de cara a las consideraciones de la sentencia.\n\nEn los términos expuestos, se admite el recurso de casación interpuesto por QUÍMICOS HOLANDA COSTA RICA S.A., salvo los agravios por lesión de normas procesales, los cuales se rechazan de plano.",
  "excerpt_en": "Upon analyzing the foregoing arguments, it is observed that the cassation appellant does not comply, at least with respect to these objections, with the rules that must be followed when filing an extraordinary cassation appeal. At this procedural stage it is not enough to list a series of errors; it is also necessary to indicate how the error occurred. It must be pointed out that the plaintiff's appeal fails to observe the technique that must govern this type of challenge; it cannot expect its grounds to be examined through mere allegations of defenselessness and lack of reasoning, without delving into the reasons, as if it were an ordinary appeal; much less that all those issues be reviewed without explaining in detail how the harm occurred. That is, without analyzing in detail why it was harmed and how the disregard of the procedural rule occurred. Thus, in the first ground, it does not explain or identify which part or considerations of the judgment it could not contest, or which facts or arguments of the Judges caused that defenselessness; this is also not understood or is contradictory, when it clearly and broadly sets forth its grievance based on the improper application and interpretation of those articles 340 of the LGAP and 98 of the LOA. In other words, it does not explain what the grievance consists of in light of the judgment's reasoning.\n\nOn the above terms, the cassation appeal filed by QUÍMICOS HOLANDA COSTA RICA S.A. is admitted, except for the grounds based on violation of procedural rules, which are flatly dismissed.",
  "outcome": {
    "label_en": "Partially admissible",
    "label_es": "Parcialmente admisible",
    "summary_en": "The Court admits the three substantive grounds of cassation, but flatly dismisses the two procedural grounds for informality.",
    "summary_es": "El Tribunal admite los tres cargos de fondo del recurso de casación, pero rechaza de plano los dos motivos procesales por informalidad."
  },
  "pull_quotes": [
    {
      "context": "Considerando V",
      "quote_en": "It is required that the appeal contain a minimum of legal reasoning [...] it must explain the reasons on which it bases its request, contesting the legal arguments of the appealed judgment and setting forth, at least, some normative reference that supports it.",
      "quote_es": "Se requiere que el recurso cuente con una fundamentación jurídica mínima [...] deben explicarse las razones en las cuales sustenta su gestión, combatiendo los argumentos de derecho de la sentencia recurrida y consignando, al menos, alguna referencia normativa que le dé sustento."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando V",
      "quote_en": "Legal reasoning is, therefore, alien to the confused deployment of rules and allegations; to the mix of unintelligible arguments or the mere expression of opinions on the admissibility or justice of the case.",
      "quote_es": "La fundamentación es, por tanto, ajena al despliegue confuso de normas y alegatos; a la mezcla de argumentos ininteligibles o a la simple exposición de opiniones sobre la procedencia o justicia del caso."
    },
    {
      "context": "Considerando VII",
      "quote_en": "It does not explain what the grievance consists of in light of the judgment's reasoning. [...] the technique used is not correct and lacks a clear and direct explanation regarding the infringement of the procedural rule.",
      "quote_es": "No explica en qué consiste el agravio de cara a las consideraciones de la sentencia. [...] la técnica utilizada no es la correcta y carece de una explicación clara y directa en cuanto a la lesión de la norma procesal."
    }
  ],
  "cites": [],
  "cited_by": [],
  "references": {
    "internal": [],
    "external": []
  },
  "source_url": "https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-1011-892304",
  "tier": 2,
  "_editorial_citation_count": 0,
  "regulations_by_article": null,
  "amendments_by_article": null,
  "dictamen_by_article": null,
  "concordancias_by_article": null,
  "afectaciones_by_article": null,
  "resoluciones_by_article": null,
  "cited_by_votos": [],
  "cited_norms": [],
  "cited_norms_inverted": [],
  "sentencias_relacionadas": [],
  "temas_y_subtemas": [],
  "cascade_only": false,
  "amendment_count": 0,
  "body_es_text": "*150009741027CA*\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nExp. 15-000974-1027-CA\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nRes. 000001-A-S1-2018\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n TRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN DE LO CONTENCIOSO\r\nADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. San José, a las nueve horas del once de enero del dos mil\r\ndieciocho.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nEn proceso de conocimiento, interpuesto en el\r\nTribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, por QUÍMICOS\r\nHOLANDA COSTA RICA S.A. contra el ESTADO, el apoderado especial\r\njudicial de la empresa actora formula recurso de casación contra la sentencia\r\nno. 129-2016 de las 7 horas 50 minutos del 8 de diciembre de 2016 dictada por\r\nla Sección Octava de ese Tribunal.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nI.- De\r\nconformidad con lo dispuesto por el numeral 139 del Código Procesal Contencioso\r\nAdministrativo (CPCA) el recurso planteado por la\r\nempresa demandante resulta admisible en cuanto a los tres cargos por lesión de\r\nnormas sustantivas expuestos, no así los motivos de\r\ncasación por violación de normas procesales. Acorde a lo señalado en el ordinal\r\n142 del cuerpo procesal de cita, se pone en conocimiento de la admisión de los\r\ntres cargos de fondo del recurso al ESTADO por el plazo de 10 días\r\nhábiles. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nII.- Se\r\ncalifica la casación como una instancia de carácter extraordinario, básicamente\r\npor dos razones. En primer término, porque no toda resolución judicial es\r\npasible de tal recurso, sino tan sólo las contempladas en la ley. Y, en segundo\r\nlugar, porque las causales de impugnación en esa etapa revisora no son\r\nabiertas, sino preestablecidas, de igual modo, por el ordenamiento jurídico. En\r\nlo relativo al primer aspecto, cabe señalar, como regla general, que son\r\nsusceptibles del recurso de casación las sentencias y los autos con carácter de\r\nsentencia capaces de producir cosa juzgada material. Frente a esta fórmula\r\ngenérica, el propio CPCA, puntualiza algunas\r\nresoluciones particulares a las cuales se les concede esta opción. A manera de\r\nejemplo, se encuentran en esta posibilidad: la que declara la inadmisibilidad de la demanda (art.\r\n62.3) y la que declara con lugar las defensas previas indicadas en el apartado\r\n6) del canon 92 del Código de cita. Por ende, los autos comunes y las\r\nresoluciones que no definan el fondo del asunto o no pongan término al proceso,\r\ntienen vedado el paso recursivo a la etapa casacional.\r\nEn lo que atañe a las causales, cabe agregar que opera la dualidad entre las\r\nprocesales y las sustantivas. Así se plasma en los preceptos 137 y 138 Ibíd.\r\nPara las primeras se efectúa un listado en términos amplios, de gran cobertura,\r\ny en los presupuestos que procede, ajustados a las\r\nreglas de la oralidad. Respecto de los sustantivos,\r\nse prevé la posible infracción de los elementos probatorios (por desapego o contradicción con ellos, o bien, preterición o\r\nindebida valoración), denominada comúnmente “violación indirecta ”. Por otro lado, formando parte\r\nde este último grupo, se encuentra la infracción estrictamente normativa, que\r\nocurre en el supuesto de una aplicación indebida, una incorrecta interpretación\r\no una desaplicación reprochable de la norma, conocida en la tradición jurídica\r\ncostarricense como “violación directa ”. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nIII.- Una\r\nvez hecha la mención de las resoluciones sobre las que cabe recurso de casación\r\ny sus causales, se hace imprescindible enfocar los requisitos necesarios para\r\nsu admisibilidad. En este sentido, bueno es recordar que la vocación antiformalista con que irrumpe el CPCA\r\nen el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense permea\r\ntodos y cada uno de sus propios institutos. De esta manera, el recurso de\r\ncasación se libera también de excesivos requisitos de admisibilidad, con el fin\r\nde que el órgano casacional (como vértice del\r\nsistema) pueda ingresar, las más de las veces, al análisis de los quebrantos\r\nalegados, sean procesales o sustantivos, en cumplimiento del fin esencial de\r\nesta instancia jurisdiccional y de quien a ella acude. Es así como se ha\r\nestablecido una casación menos rigurosa en lo relativo a los aspectos de\r\nadmisibilidad, sin abandonar el tecnicismo que le es propio ni su naturaleza y\r\nesencia, pues al fin y al cabo se mantiene incólume su rol y finalidad dentro\r\ndel régimen procesal moderno. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nIV.- Ahora\r\nbien, pese a la informalidad que propugna la legislación procesal vigente para\r\nformular el recurso de casación, se articulan, como es lógico, una serie de\r\nrequisitos mínimos e imprescindibles relativos al tiempo, lugar y forma. Se\r\ncrean mediante ley, en tanto imprescindibles para este particular recurso\r\nextraordinario, ya que sin ellos no habría orden ni equilibrio procesal;\r\nempero, han de interpretarse de manera flexible y razonable, pues precisa\r\nrecordar que los señalados en el artículo 139 del Código de referencia, son los\r\núnicos requisitos y formalidades previstos para el recurso de casación, según\r\nlo señala el inciso 5) de ese mismo precepto. De esta manera, en el apartado 1)\r\nde la norma recién citada, se establece que el recurso en mención deberá\r\npresentarse directamente ante la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia o\r\nante el Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo. Se modifica, en\r\nforma leve para el contencioso administrativo, el sistema hasta ahora vigente\r\nen la legislación procesal civil, dado que ahora la Sala o el Tribunal no solo\r\nse pronuncia sobre la admisibilidad; de conformidad con el canon 142.1 del\r\nCódigo de la materia, lo pone en conocimiento de la parte contraria por el\r\nplazo de 10 días (notificándole por el medio que haya establecido, de acuerdo\r\ncon la comunicación que le fue girada de previo por el órgano jurisdiccional de\r\ninstancia). Se busca con esto la estandarización del régimen recursivo que\r\npresenta el Código, dado que por regla, sean ordinarios o extraordinarios, se\r\npresentan directamente ante el superior encargado de conocerlos. En otro orden\r\nde ideas, en el mismo acápite normativo, se establece el plazo para su\r\ninterposición: 15 días hábiles contados a partir del día hábil siguiente de\r\nnotificadas todas las partes. Si se hubiere\r\ninterpuesto adición o aclaración, el plazo indicado empezará a correr a partir\r\ndel día hábil siguiente de notificadas todas las partes de lo resuelto sobre\r\nello. Superado el tiempo y lugar de presentación se enumeran, en el apartado\r\n2), una serie de requisitos de “información” e “identificación” del recurrente\r\ny del proceso que, por su naturaleza (“datos”, “información de trámite”), pueden\r\nser subsanados en el plazo de tres días, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el numeral\r\n141 del mismo cuerpo normativo. Así, deberá indicarse: a) el tipo de proceso;\r\nb) el nombre completo de las partes; c) la firma del recurrente o recurrentes\r\nautenticada por abogado; d) hora y fecha de la resolución recurrida; e) número\r\nde expediente en el cual fue dictada y f) medio para recibir notificaciones. Con\r\nello se completa el listado simple de exigencias instrumentales o adjetivas del\r\nrecurso. Sólo en el evento de que se incumpla la prevención dictada al efecto,\r\nse dispondrá el rechazo de plano y, por ende, el archivo del asunto, pero en\r\nese caso, no sólo por la omisión misma, sino por la desatención a lo prevenido\r\njudicialmente. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nV.- A\r\nlos anteriores requisitos se añade un último requerimiento material (artículo\r\n139.3 ibídem), en tanto necesario para la\r\nadmisibilidad y para la posterior valoración del recurso por el fondo. Se trata\r\nde la motivación del recurso, que por las características de la casación ha de\r\nser clara y precisa. En este sentido debe contener, tal como lo dispone el\r\nprecepto de comentario, la fundamentación fáctica y jurídica del caso. Fáctica,\r\nen la medida en que se muestre inconforme con los hechos que se han tenido por\r\ndemostrados o por indemostrados (lo cual lleva a la\r\nponderación de las probanzas) o con los las circunstancias acaecidas en la\r\nviolación de normas procesales; y jurídica, cuando se trata de un problema que\r\nse expone acerca de la aplicación, omisión o indebida interpretación de cualquier\r\nnorma que integre el bloque de juricidad, incluidos,\r\npor supuesto, los principios de rango constitucional o aquella que también\r\nopera por efecto reflejo o indirecto, después de que se modifican los hechos de\r\nla sentencia impugnada. Tanto en la infracción procesal, como en la\r\nprobatoria, puede concurrir, junto con las razones jurídicas (siempre\r\nnecesarias), las de carácter fáctico, y en ese sentido, los fundamentos de\r\nreferencia deberán ser dirigidos en ambas vertientes, so pena de inadmisibilidad. Por su parte, es necesario aclarar que de\r\nla fundamentación jurídica se exonera, por expreso mandato legal, la indicación\r\nde aquellos cánones relativos al valor del elemento o elementos probatorios mal\r\napreciados. De igual forma, no es indispensable citar los preceptos que\r\nestablecen los requisitos, plazos y reglas básicas para la admisión del\r\nrecurso. Antes que la cita de estas últimas, lo imprescindible es que se\r\ncumplan, que se pongan en práctica al momento de elaborar e interponer la\r\ncasación. Así las cosas, la fundamentación dispuesta por ley puede entenderse,\r\ngrosso modo, como aquella argumentación técnico-jurídica en la que se mencionan\r\nuna serie de artículos, o reglas jurídicas entrelazadas o concatenadas entre sí\r\ny vinculadas razonablemente en una doble perspectiva: con los argumentos del\r\nrecurso y con la sentencia que se ataca. En la medida en que se cite un\r\nconjunto de normas jurídicas (o si es del caso, una sola de ellas) atinente y\r\nvinculada de manera clara con la sentencia combatida (ya sea en el sustento de\r\nhecho o derecho) y los argumentos del recurso, hay fundamentación jurídica. Los\r\nagregados jurisprudenciales o las eventuales citas doctrinales, reforzarán en\r\nocasiones las alegaciones efectuadas pero, por lo general, no hacen a su\r\nesencia. Como lo ha dispuesto ya la Sala Primera y este Tribunal de Casación,\r\ninterpretando el artículo 139 de referencia, “se requiere que el recurso\r\ncuente con una fundamentación jurídica mínima [...\r\n] deben explicarse las razones en las\r\ncuales sustenta su gestión, combatiendo los argumentos de derecho de la\r\nsentencia recurrida y consignando, al menos, alguna referencia normativa que le\r\ndé sustento” (resolución no. 318-A-2008, de las 14 horas 25 minutos del 8\r\nde mayo de 2008). La fundamentación es, por tanto, ajena al despliegue confuso\r\nde normas y alegatos; a la mezcla de argumentos ininteligibles o a la simple\r\nexposición de opiniones sobre la procedencia o justicia del caso; o bien, al\r\nrecuento de los desaciertos que se consideran cometidos en la sentencia\r\nrecurrida sin respaldo en normas o criterios jurídicos. De allí que, si el\r\nrecurso omite por completo esa relación técnico-normativa a la que se ha hecho\r\nreferencia o la que realiza resulta impertinente o desvinculada al caso de\r\nmanera manifiesta y evidente, habrá que entender que carece de “total\r\nfundamentación jurídica”, y por tanto, incumple el necesario requisito\r\nestablecido en el numeral 139.3, que se sanciona con el rechazo de plano, a\r\ntenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 140 inciso c), ambos del mismo Código de referencia.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nVI.- En\r\nel caso en estudio, el casacionista presenta su\r\nrecurso estructurado en cargos por lesión de normas procesales y sustantivas. A\r\ncontinuación, solamente se citarán los dos motivos de casación por quebranto\r\nde normas procesales. En el primer alegato, alega\r\nindefensión. Acusa, al resolver el tema de la caducidad del procedimiento, el\r\nTribunal mencionó el artículo 340 de la Ley General de la Administración\r\nPública (LGAP); sin embargo, protesta, no lo analizó.\r\nA su entender, citar dicha norma legal sin entrar a su análisis, deja a la\r\nparte actora en un estado de indefensión, al impedir que puedan valorar y\r\nrefutar las consideraciones de la sentencia. De igual forma sucede, dice, al\r\nresolver sobre el cambio de destino de los supuestos gastos contemplados en el\r\nmonto del daño ambiental, pues el Tribunal menciona el artículo 98 de la Ley\r\nOrgánica del Ambiente (LOA), sin embargo, omite analizarlo. Segundo.\r\nArguye falta de motivación, pues en su juicio, el yerro procesal se presenta,\r\nporque los Juzgadores citan los artículos 340 de la LGAP\r\ny 98 de la LOA, sin que resulten aplicables al caso. Indica, se limitaron a\r\ncitar puntualmente esos artículos como fundamento de lo que resuelven sobre la\r\ncaducidad y el cambio de destino de los daños estimados, sin analizar ni\r\nfundamentar en modo alguno, por qué razón resultaban aplicables. Agrega, la\r\ncondenatoria en costas también carece de motivación y fundamento legal, pese a\r\nque presentaron una demanda concreta y bien fundamentada desde el punto de\r\nvista fáctico, jurídico y probatorio, lo cual demuestra la buena con que han\r\nlitigado.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nVII.- Analizados\r\nlos anteriores planteamientos, se observa que el casacionista\r\nno respeta, al menos en cuanto a estas censuras, las reglas que es menester\r\nacatar a la hora de interponer un recurso extraordinario de casación. No basta\r\nen esta etapa procesal, expresar una serie de yerros, también es necesario\r\nindicar, la forma cómo este se presentó. Debe hacerse la indicación que el\r\nrecurso de la parte demandante no respeta la técnica que ha de imperar en este\r\ntipo de impugnaciones, no puede pretender que se analicen sus cargos con\r\nsimples manifestaciones de lo que estima es una indefensión y falta de\r\nmotivación, sin ahondar en los motivos, como si se tratare de una apelación; y\r\nmenos aún que se revisen todos esos temas, sin que se explique con detalle cómo\r\nse dio el perjuicio. Es decir, sin que se haya analizado a detalle, por qué es\r\nperjudicado y cómo se presentó la inobservancia de la norma procesal. Así las\r\ncosas, en el primer motivo , no explica ni identifica qué\r\nparte o consideraciones de la sentencia no pudo combatir, cuales hechos o\r\nargumentos de los Jueces le causaron esa indefensión; lo cual tampoco se\r\nentiende o es contradictorio, cuando de forma clara y amplia expone su agravio\r\npor indebida aplicación e interpretación de aquellas normas 340 de la LGAP y 98 de la LOA. En otras palabras, no explica en qué\r\nconsiste el agravio de cara a las consideraciones de la sentencia. Por el\r\ncontrario, lo que parece exponer es una falta de motivación, pero se equivocan\r\nen la técnica, pues encasillan el motivo como indefensión solamente. De igual\r\nmodo, aunque en el segundo cargo aduce falta de motivación por motivos\r\nparecidos al primero, nuevamente omite indicar en qué consiste el agravio. Es\r\ndecir, falta identificar y analizar cómo se dio el agravio o cuál es el\r\nperjuicio que se le ocasiona, requisito indispensable para que proceda el cargo\r\nprocesal de cita. Recuérdese, es deber suyo describir de forma ordenada y con claridad\r\nlos agravios que son de su interés, pues esta Sala no tiene el deber procesal\r\nde descifrar y a veces interpretar, cuál es el alegato planteado. La técnica\r\nutilizada no es la correcta y carece de una explicación clara y directa en\r\ncuanto a la lesión de la norma procesal. Dicho lo anterior, se infiere que\r\nambos reproches son plenamente informales, porque estima este Tribunal, no se\r\nsigue una correcta praxis casacional. La parte\r\nrecurrente olvida que no resulta suficiente manifestar una serie de disconformidades\r\ngenerales y meramente argumentativas, en tanto es menester, según se ha\r\ndicho, el contraste de lo decidido con la infracción general que, en su\r\ncriterio, tuvo lugar de conformidad con los motivos expresamente regulados en\r\nel CPCA. En consecuencia, los reclamos en cuanto a\r\nestas censuras resultan informales, por lo que deberán rechazarse de plano.\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nPOR TANTO \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nEn los términos expuestos, se admite el recurso de\r\ncasación interpuesto por QUÍMICOS HOLANDA COSTA RICA S.A., salvo los\r\nagravios por lesión de normas procesales, los cuales se rechazan de plano. De\r\nél, se confiere traslado al ESTADO, por el plazo de 10 días hábiles contados a\r\npartir de la notificación de este auto. \n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \r\n \nLuis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga\n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n \nRomán\r\n Solís Zelaya \r\n \n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \r\n \n\r\n \nCarmenmaría Escoto Fernández\n\r\n \n\r\n \r\n \n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n \n\r\n\r\n\nJROSALES \n\r\n\r\n\nEXP: 15-000974-1027-CA\n\r\n\r\n\n\r\n\r\n\nTeléfonos: (506) 2295-3658 o 2295-3659, correo\r\nelectrónico sala_primera@poder-judicial.go.cr",
  "body_en_text": "*150009741027CA*\n\nExp. 15-000974-1027-CA\n\nRes. 000001-A-S1-2018\n\nTRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. San José, at nine hours on January eleventh, two thousand eighteen.\n\nIn an ordinary proceeding, filed before the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda by QUÍMICOS HOLANDA COSTA RICA S.A. against the ESTADO, the special judicial representative of the plaintiff company files a cassation appeal against judgment no. 129-2016 of 7 hours 50 minutes on December 8, 2016, issued by the Eighth Section of that Tribunal.\n\nCONSIDERANDO\n\nI.- In accordance with the provisions of numeral 139 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), the appeal filed by the plaintiff company is admissible with respect to the three grounds for violation of substantive norms set forth, but not the cassation grounds for violation of procedural norms. Pursuant to the provisions of article 142 of the cited procedural body, notice of the admission of the three substantive grounds of the appeal is given to the ESTADO for a period of 10 business days.\n\nII.- Cassation is classified as an extraordinary instance, basically for two reasons. First, because not every judicial resolution is subject to such an appeal, but only those contemplated by law. And second, because the grounds for challenge at this review stage are not open-ended but pre-established, likewise, by the legal system. Regarding the first aspect, it should be noted, as a general rule, that judgments and orders with the character of a judgment capable of producing res judicata (cosa juzgada material) are subject to the cassation appeal. Faced with this generic formula, the CPCA itself specifies certain particular resolutions to which this option is granted. By way of example, this possibility includes: the one declaring the inadmissibility of the complaint (Art. 62.3) and the one upholding the preliminary defenses indicated in subsection 6) of canon 92 of the cited Code. Therefore, ordinary orders and resolutions that do not decide the merits of the matter or terminate the proceeding are barred from proceeding to the cassation stage. With regard to the grounds, it should be added that a duality exists between procedural and substantive grounds. This is reflected in precepts 137 and 138 Ibid. For the former, a list is provided in broad, highly comprehensive terms, and under the applicable circumstances, adjusted to the rules of orality. Regarding substantive grounds, the possible violation of evidentiary elements is foreseen (by disregard or contradiction with them, or by preterition (preterición) or improper valuation), commonly called \"indirect violation\" (violación indirecta). On the other hand, forming part of this latter group, is the strictly normative violation, which occurs in the event of an improper application, an incorrect interpretation, or a reprehensible non-application of the norm, known in the Costa Rican legal tradition as \"direct violation\" (violación directa).\n\nIII.- Having mentioned the resolutions against which a cassation appeal lies and its grounds, it is essential to focus on the requirements necessary for its admissibility. In this regard, it is well to remember that the anti-formalist (antiformalista) vocation with which the CPCA bursts into the Costa Rican legal system permeates each and every one of its own institutions. In this way, the cassation appeal is also freed from excessive admissibility requirements, so that the cassation body (as the apex of the system) may, most of the time, proceed to analyze the alleged breaches, whether procedural or substantive, in fulfillment of the essential purpose of this jurisdictional instance and of those who resort to it. Thus, a less rigorous cassation has been established concerning admissibility aspects, without abandoning its inherent technicality or its nature and essence, for ultimately, its role and purpose within the modern procedural regime remain intact.\n\nIV.- However, despite the informality that the current procedural legislation advocates for formulating the cassation appeal, a series of minimum and indispensable requirements relating to time, place, and form are, logically, articulated. They are created by law, as they are essential for this particular extraordinary appeal, since without them there would be no procedural order or balance; yet, they must be interpreted flexibly and reasonably, for it is necessary to remember that those indicated in article 139 of the reference Code are the only requirements and formalities provided for the cassation appeal, as stated in subsection 5) of that same precept. Thus, in subsection 1) of the recently cited norm, it is established that the appeal in question must be filed directly before the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia or before the Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo. The system in force until now in civil procedural legislation is slightly modified for the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, given that now the Chamber or Tribunal not only rules on admissibility; in accordance with canon 142.1 of the Code of the matter, it notifies the opposing party for a period of 10 days (notifying them by the means they have established, in accordance with the communication previously sent to them by the trial court). This seeks the standardization of the appellate regime presented by the Code, given that as a rule, whether ordinary or extraordinary, appeals are filed directly before the superior court responsible for hearing them. In another vein, in the same normative section, the deadline for its filing is established: 15 business days counted from the business day following notification to all parties. If an addition or clarification (adición o aclaración) has been filed, the indicated period shall begin to run from the business day following notification to all parties of the ruling thereon. Once time and place of filing are surpassed, a series of \"information\" and \"identification\" requirements of the appellant and the proceeding are listed in subsection 2), which, due to their nature (\"data,\" \"procedural information\"), may be corrected within three days, pursuant to the provisions of numeral 141 of the same normative body. Thus, the following must be indicated: a) the type of proceeding; b) the full names of the parties; c) the signature of the appellant(s) authenticated by an attorney; d) hour and date of the appealed resolution; e) case file number (número de expediente) in which it was issued; and f) means for receiving notifications. This completes the simple list of instrumental or adjective requirements for the appeal. Only in the event that the court order (prevención) issued for this purpose is not complied with, will the appeal be rejected outright (rechazo de plano) and, therefore, the matter archived, but in that case, not only for the omission itself, but also for the disregard of the judicial order.\n\nV.- To the above requirements is added a final material requirement (article 139.3 ibidem), as it is necessary for the admissibility and subsequent evaluation of the appeal on its merits. This refers to the grounds (motivación) of the appeal, which, due to the characteristics of cassation, must be clear and precise. In this regard, it must contain, as provided in the precept under comment, the factual and legal basis of the case. Factual, to the extent that it shows disagreement with the facts that have been deemed proven or unproven (which leads to the weighing of evidence (probanzas)) or with the circumstances occurring in the violation of procedural norms; and legal, when it concerns a problem raised about the application, omission, or improper interpretation of any norm that makes up the body of legality (bloque de juricidad), including, of course, principles of constitutional rank or any norm that also operates by a reflex or indirect effect, after the facts of the appealed judgment have been modified. Both in the procedural and evidentiary violation, factual reasons may concur (together with the always-necessary legal reasons), and in that sense, the referenced foundations must be directed along both lines, under penalty of inadmissibility. For its part, it is necessary to clarify that the legal foundation is exempted, by express legal mandate, from indicating those canons related to the value of the poorly assessed evidentiary element(s). Likewise, it is not essential to cite the precepts that establish the requirements, deadlines, and basic rules for the admission of the appeal. Rather than citing the latter, the essential thing is that they are complied with, that they are put into practice when preparing and filing the cassation. Thus, the foundation provided by law can be understood, broadly speaking, as that technical-legal argumentation in which a series of articles or legal rules are mentioned, intertwined or concatenated and reasonably linked in a dual perspective: with the arguments of the appeal and with the judgment under attack. To the extent that a set of pertinent legal norms (or if applicable, a single one) is cited and clearly linked to the contested judgment (whether in its factual or legal support) and the arguments of the appeal, there is a legal foundation. Jurisprudential additions or eventual doctrinal citations will sometimes reinforce the allegations made but, generally, do not constitute their essence. As already established by the Sala Primera and this Tribunal de Casación, interpreting article 139 of reference, \"the appeal must have a minimum legal foundation [...] the reasons upon which it bases its request must be explained, combating the legal arguments of the appealed judgment and consigning, at least, some normative reference that supports it\" (resolution no. 318-A-2008, of 14 hours 25 minutes on May 8, 2008). The foundation is, therefore, alien to the confused display of norms and allegations; to the mixture of unintelligible arguments or the simple exposition of opinions on the appropriateness or justice of the case; or, to the recounting of the errors considered committed in the appealed judgment without support in legal norms or criteria. Hence, if the appeal completely omits that technical-normative relationship to which reference has been made, or the one it carries out is manifestly and evidently impertinent or disconnected from the case, it must be understood to lack \"total legal foundation,\" and therefore, fails to comply with the necessary requirement established in numeral 139.3, which is punishable by outright rejection, pursuant to the provisions of article 140 subsection c), both of the same reference Code.\n\nVI.- In the case under study, the cassation appellant presents its appeal structured in grounds for violations of procedural and substantive norms. Below, only the two cassation grounds for breach of procedural norms will be cited. In the first allegation, it alleges defenselessness (indefensión). It claims that, when resolving the issue of the expiration (caducidad) of the proceeding, the Tribunal mentioned article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP); however, it protests, it did not analyze it. In its view, citing that legal norm without analyzing it leaves the plaintiff party in a state of defenselessness, by preventing them from assessing and refuting the considerations of the judgment. The same happens, it says, when resolving on the change of destination of the supposed expenses contemplated in the amount of environmental damage, because the Tribunal mentions article 98 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente (LOA), yet omits analyzing it. Second. It argues lack of grounds (falta de motivación), since in its judgment, the procedural error arises because the Judges cite articles 340 of the LGAP and 98 of the LOA, without them being applicable to the case. It indicates that they merely cited those articles as the basis for what they resolve regarding the expiration and the change of destination of the estimated damages, without analyzing or grounding in any way why those reasons were applicable. It adds that the condemnation in costs also lacks grounds and legal basis, despite having presented a specific claim well-founded from a factual, legal, and evidentiary standpoint, which demonstrates the good faith in which they have litigated.\n\nVII.- Having analyzed the foregoing arguments, it is observed that the cassation appellant does not respect, at least regarding these objections, the rules that must be observed when filing an extraordinary cassation appeal. It is not enough at this procedural stage to express a series of errors; it is also necessary to indicate how the error occurred. The indication must be made that the plaintiff party's appeal does not respect the technique that must prevail in this type of challenge; it cannot expect its grounds to be analyzed with simple manifestations of what it deems defenselessness and lack of grounds, without delving into the reasons, as if it were an appeal; and even less so that all these issues be reviewed, without explaining in detail how the harm occurred. That is, without having analyzed in detail why it is harmed and how the non-observance of the procedural norm occurred. Thus, in the first ground, it does not explain or identify which part or considerations of the judgment it could not combat, which facts or arguments of the Judges caused it that defenselessness; which is also not understood or is contradictory, when it clearly and extensively sets forth its grievance regarding the improper application and interpretation of those norms 340 of the LGAP and 98 of the LOA. In other words, it does not explain what the grievance consists of vis-à-vis the considerations of the judgment. On the contrary, what it seems to expose is a lack of grounds, but it errs in technique, as it classifies the ground solely as defenselessness. Similarly, although in the second ground it alleges lack of grounds for reasons similar to the first, it again omits to indicate what the grievance consists of. That is, it fails to identify and analyze how the grievance occurred or what the harm caused to it is, an indispensable requirement for the cited procedural ground to proceed. It should be remembered that it is its duty to describe in an orderly and clear manner the grievances that are of interest to it, as this Chamber has no procedural duty to decipher and sometimes interpret what the allegation is. The technique used is not correct and lacks a clear and direct explanation regarding the violation of the procedural norm. Having said that, it is inferred that both objections are fully informal, because this Tribunal considers that a correct cassation practice is not followed. The appellant party forgets that it is not enough to state a series of general and merely argumentative disagreements, as it is necessary, as has been said, to contrast what was decided with the general violation that, in its opinion, took place in accordance with the grounds expressly regulated in the CPCA. Consequently, the claims regarding these objections are informal, and therefore must be rejected outright.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nIn the terms set forth, the cassation appeal filed by QUÍMICOS HOLANDA COSTA RICA S.A. is admitted, except for the grievances for violation of procedural norms, which are rejected outright. On the admitted portion, transfer (traslado) is granted to the ESTADO, for a period of 10 business days counted from the notification of this order.\n\nLuis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga\n\nRomán Solís Zelaya\n\nCarmenmaría Escoto Fernández\n\nJROSALES\n\nEXP: 15-000974-1027-CA\n\nTelephones: (506) 2295-3658 or 2295-3659, email sala_primera@poder-judicial.go.cr\n\nThus, subsection 1) of the recently cited provision establishes that the aforementioned appeal must be filed directly before the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice or before the Administrative-Contentious Cassation Court. The system until now in force in civil procedural legislation is slightly modified for the administrative-contentious sphere, given that now the Chamber or the Court not only rules on admissibility; in accordance with canon 142.1 of the relevant Code, it notifies the opposing party within a period of 10 days (notifying them by the means they have established, in accordance with the prior communication sent to them by the lower court). The aim of this is the standardization of the appeal system presented in the Code, given that as a rule, whether ordinary or extraordinary, appeals are filed directly before the superior court responsible for hearing them. In another vein, the same normative subsection establishes the deadline for its filing: 15 working days counted from the working day following the notification of all parties. If an addition or clarification (adición o aclaración) has been filed, the indicated deadline shall begin to run from the working day following the notification of all parties regarding the ruling on that matter. Once the time and place of filing are specified, subsection 2) lists a series of requirements for \"information\" and \"identification\" of the appellant and the proceedings that, by their nature (\"data,\" \"procedural information\"), may be corrected within a period of three days, pursuant to the provisions of numeral 141 of the same normative body. Thus, the following must be indicated: a) the type of proceeding; b) the full name of the parties; c) the signature of the appellant or appellants authenticated by an attorney; d) the time and date of the appealed ruling; e) the case file number in which it was issued; and f) the means for receiving notifications. This completes the simple list of instrumental or adjective requirements of the appeal. Only in the event that the warning issued to that effect is not heeded, shall outright rejection be ordered and, consequently, the matter archived, but in that case, not only due to the omission itself, but due to the disregard of the judicial warning.\n\n**V.-** To the above requirements is added a final substantive requirement (Article 139.3 ibidem), insofar as it is necessary for admissibility and for the subsequent evaluation of the appeal on its merits. This is the statement of grounds for the appeal, which, due to the characteristics of cassation, must be clear and precise. In this sense, it must contain, as provided by the precept under discussion, the factual and legal basis of the case. Factual, to the extent that it shows disagreement with the facts that have been deemed proven or unproven (which leads to the weighing of the evidence) or with the circumstances occurring in the violation of procedural rules; and legal, when it involves a problem raised regarding the application, omission, or improper interpretation of any rule comprising the body of legality (bloque de juricidad), including, of course, principles of constitutional rank or those that also operate by reflex or indirect effect, after the facts of the challenged judgment are modified. In both procedural and evidentiary violations, factual reasons may concur alongside the (always necessary) legal reasons, and in that sense, the referenced grounds must be directed along both lines, under penalty of inadmissibility. For its part, it is necessary to clarify that the indication of those canons relating to the value of the evidentiary element or elements poorly assessed is exempted from the legal grounds by express legal mandate. Likewise, it is not essential to cite the precepts establishing the requirements, deadlines, and basic rules for the admission of the appeal. Rather than the citation of these latter, what is essential is that they be fulfilled, that they be put into practice when drafting and filing the cassation appeal. This being the case, the grounds required by law can be understood, broadly speaking, as that technical-legal argumentation in which a series of articles or legal rules are mentioned, intertwined or concatenated with each other and reasonably linked in a dual perspective: with the arguments of the appeal and with the judgment being challenged. To the extent that a set of relevant legal rules (or, if applicable, a single one) is cited and clearly linked to the contested judgment (whether in its factual or legal basis) and the arguments of the appeal, there is a legal basis. Jurisprudential additions or eventual doctrinal citations will at times reinforce the allegations made but, generally, do not constitute their essence. As already established by the First Chamber and this Cassation Court, interpreting Article 139 in question, \"it is required that the appeal have a minimum legal basis [...] the reasons on which the appellant bases their action must be explained, countering the legal arguments of the appealed judgment and setting forth, at least, some normative reference that gives it support\" (ruling no. 318-A-2008, of 14 hours 25 minutes on May 8, 2008). The statement of grounds is, therefore, unrelated to a confused display of rules and allegations; to a mixture of unintelligible arguments or the simple exposition of opinions on the appropriateness or fairness of the case; or, indeed, to a recounting of the errors considered to have been committed in the appealed judgment without support in legal rules or criteria. Hence, if the appeal completely omits that technical-normative relationship to which reference has been made, or the relationship it makes is manifestly and evidently irrelevant or disconnected from the case, it must be understood to lack \"total legal basis (total fundamentación jurídica),\" and therefore, fails to comply with the necessary requirement established in numeral 139.3, punishable by outright rejection, pursuant to the provisions of Article 140 subsection c), both of the same Code under reference.\n\n**VI.-** In the case under study, the cassation appellant presents their appeal structured in charges for the violation of procedural and substantive rules. Below, only the **two grounds for cassation due to breach of procedural rules** will be cited. In the **first** allegation, it claims defenselessness (indefensión). It charges that, when resolving the issue of the expiration of the proceeding (caducidad del procedimiento), the Court mentioned Article 340 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP); however, it protests, it did not analyze it. In its understanding, citing that legal rule without analyzing it leaves the plaintiff party in a state of defenselessness, by preventing them from evaluating and refuting the considerations of the judgment. The same occurs, it states, when ruling on the change of destination of the alleged expenses considered within the amount of environmental damage (daño ambiental), since the Court mentions Article 98 of the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, LOA), yet omits analyzing it. **Second.** It argues a lack of statement of reasons (falta de motivación), since in its judgment, the procedural error is present because the Judges cite Articles 340 of the LGAP and 98 of the LOA, which are not applicable to the case. It indicates they merely cited those articles punctually as grounds for their rulings on the expiration and the change of destination of the estimated damages, without analyzing or grounding in any way the reason why they were applicable. It adds that the order to pay costs also lacks a statement of reasons and legal basis, despite presenting a specific and well-founded claim from a factual, legal, and evidentiary point of view, which demonstrates the good faith with which they have litigated.\n\n**VII.-** Having analyzed the foregoing arguments, it is observed that the cassation appellant does not respect, at least regarding these criticisms, the rules that must be followed when filing an extraordinary cassation appeal. It is not sufficient at this procedural stage to express a series of errors; it is also necessary to indicate how this occurred. It must be pointed out that the plaintiff party's appeal does not respect the technique that must prevail in this type of challenge; it cannot expect its charges to be analyzed with simple statements of what it considers to be defenselessness and a lack of statement of reasons, without delving into the grounds, as if it were an appeal; and even less so that all these issues be reviewed, without explaining in detail how the prejudice occurred. That is, without having analyzed in detail why it is prejudiced and how the non-observance of the procedural rule occurred. This being the case, in the first ground, it does not explain or identify which part or considerations of the judgment it could not combat, what facts or arguments of the Judges caused that defenselessness; which is also not understood or is contradictory, when it clearly and extensively states its grievance for improper application and interpretation of those rules, 340 of the LGAP and 98 of the LOA. In other words, it does not explain what the grievance consists of in view of the judgment's considerations. On the contrary, what it seems to expose is a lack of statement of reasons, but it errs in technique, by pigeonholing the ground solely as defenselessness. Likewise, although in the second charge it alleges a lack of statement of reasons for reasons similar to the first, it again omits to indicate what the grievance consists of. That is, it fails to identify and analyze how the grievance occurred or what the prejudice caused to it is, an indispensable requirement for the cited procedural charge to proceed. It should be remembered that it is its duty to describe in an orderly and clear manner the grievances that are of interest to it, as this Chamber does not have the procedural duty to decipher and sometimes interpret what the allegation raised is. The technique used is not correct and lacks a clear and direct explanation regarding the violation of the procedural rule. Having said the above, it is inferred that both criticisms are fully informal, because this Court considers that a correct cassation practice is not followed. The appellant forgets that manifesting a series of general and merely argumentative disagreements is not sufficient, as it is necessary, as has been stated, to contrast what was decided with the general violation that, in its opinion, took place in accordance with the grounds expressly regulated in the CPCA. Consequently, the claims regarding these criticisms are informal and must therefore be rejected outright.\n\n**THEREFORE**\n\nIn the terms stated, the cassation appeal filed by **QUÍMICOS HOLANDA COSTA RICA S.A.** is admitted, except for the grievances based on the violation of procedural rules, which are rejected outright. Of it, a copy is transferred to the STATE, for a period of 10 working days counted from the notification of this order.\n\n| Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga |\n| :--- |\n| Román Solís Zelaya | Carmemaría Escoto Fernández |\n\nJROSALES\n\nEXP: 15-000974-1027-CA\n\nTeléfonos: (506) 2295-3658 o 2295-3659, correo electrónico sala_primera@poder-judicial.go.cr\n\nThe system for administrative litigation is slightly modified, in a minor way, from the system previously in force in civil procedural legislation, given that now the Chamber or the Tribunal not only rules on admissibility; in accordance with canon 142.1 of the Code on the matter, it brings it to the attention of the opposing party for a period of 10 days (notifying them by the means they have established, in accordance with the communication previously sent to them by the lower court). This seeks the standardization of the appellate regime presented in the Code, given that as a rule, whether ordinary or extraordinary, appeals are filed directly before the superior court responsible for hearing them. In another vein, the same normative section establishes the time limit for filing the appeal: 15 business days counted from the business day following the notification of all the parties. If an addition or clarification has been filed, the indicated time limit will begin to run from the business day following the notification to all the parties of the ruling on that matter. Once the time and place of filing are addressed, subsection 2) enumerates a series of requirements for the “information” and “identification” of the appellant and the proceeding which, by their nature (“data,” “procedural information”), may be corrected within a period of three days, pursuant to the provisions of numeral 141 of the same normative body. Thus, the following must be indicated: a) the type of proceeding; b) the full name of the parties; c) the signature of the appellant or appellants authenticated by an attorney; d) the time and date of the challenged ruling; e) the case file number (número de expediente) in which it was issued; and f) the means for receiving notifications. This completes the simple list of instrumental or adjective requirements for the appeal. Only in the event of non-compliance with the warning issued to that effect will outright rejection be ordered and, consequently, the archiving of the matter, but in that case, not only for the omission itself, but for the disregard of the judicial warning.\n\nV.- To the previous requirements is added a final material requirement (article 139.3 ibidem), as necessary for the admissibility and for the subsequent evaluation of the appeal on its merits. This is the statement of grounds for the appeal, which, due to the characteristics of cassation, must be clear and precise. In this sense, it must contain, as the precept under comment establishes, the factual and legal grounds of the case. Factual, to the extent that it shows disagreement with the facts that have been held as proven or unproven (which leads to the weighing of the evidence) or with the circumstances that occurred in the violation of procedural rules; and legal, when it concerns a problem raised regarding the application, omission, or improper interpretation of any rule that makes up the body of legality, including, of course, principles of constitutional rank or those that also operate by reflecting or indirect effect, after the facts of the challenged judgment are modified. In both procedural and evidentiary violations, factual reasons may concur, together with the legal reasons (always necessary), and in that sense, the referenced grounds must be directed along both lines, under penalty of inadmissibility. For its part, it is necessary to clarify that the legal grounds are exempted, by express legal mandate, from indicating those canons relating to the value of the poorly assessed probative element or elements. Likewise, it is not indispensable to cite the precepts that establish the requirements, time limits, and basic rules for the admission of the appeal. Rather than the citation of the latter, what is essential is that they be fulfilled, that they be put into practice when preparing and filing the cassation appeal. Thus, the grounds provided by law can be understood, broadly speaking, as that technical-legal argumentation in which a series of articles are mentioned, or legal rules intertwined or concatenated with each other and reasonably linked in a double perspective: with the arguments of the appeal and with the judgment being attacked. To the extent that a set of legal rules (or, if applicable, a single one of them) is cited that is relevant and clearly linked to the challenged judgment (whether in the factual or legal support) and the arguments of the appeal, there is legal grounds. Jurisprudential additions or eventual doctrinal citations will sometimes reinforce the allegations made but, generally, do not pertain to their essence. As the Sala Primera and this Tribunal de Casación have already provided, interpreting article 139 in reference, “it is required that the appeal have a minimum legal foundation [...] the reasons on which the appellant bases their petition must be explained, combating the legal arguments of the appealed judgment and recording, at least, some normative reference that gives it support” (resolution no. 318-A-2008, of 14 hours 25 minutes of May 8, 2008). The grounds are, therefore, foreign to the confused display of rules and allegations; to the mixture of unintelligible arguments or the simple exposition of opinions about the appropriateness or justice of the case; or, to the recounting of the errors considered committed in the appealed judgment without support in legal rules or criteria. Hence, if the appeal completely omits that technical-normative relationship to which reference has been made or the one it makes is clearly and evidently impertinent or disconnected from the case, it must be understood that it lacks “total legal grounds,” and therefore, fails to comply with the necessary requirement established in numeral 139.3, which is sanctioned with outright rejection, pursuant to the provisions of article 140, subsection c), both of the same Code of reference.\n\nVI.- In the case under study, the appellant presents their appeal structured in claims for violation of procedural and substantive rules. Below, only the two grounds for cassation due to breach of procedural rules will be cited. In the first allegation, they allege defenselessness (indefensión). They accuse that, in resolving the issue of the expiration of the procedure, the Tribunal mentioned article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP); however, they protest, it did not analyze it. In their understanding, citing that legal rule without analyzing it leaves the claimant party in a state of defenselessness, by preventing them from being able to evaluate and refute the considerations of the judgment. The same occurs, they say, in resolving the change of destination of the supposed expenses contemplated in the amount of environmental damage, since the Tribunal mentions article 98 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente (LOA), however, it omits analyzing it. Second. They argue a lack of statement of reasons (motivación), since in their judgment, the procedural error occurs because the Judges cite articles 340 of the LGAP and 98 of the LOA, without them being applicable to the case. They indicate that the Judges limited themselves to punctually citing those articles as the basis for what they resolve regarding the expiration and the change of destination of the estimated damages, without analyzing or grounding in any way why they were applicable. They add that the order to pay costs also lacks reasoning and legal basis, despite having presented a specific and well-grounded lawsuit from a factual, legal, and probative standpoint, which demonstrates the good faith with which they have litigated.\n\nVII.- Having analyzed the preceding arguments, it is observed that the appellant does not respect, at least regarding these criticisms, the rules that must be followed when filing an extraordinary cassation appeal. It is not enough at this procedural stage to express a series of errors; it is also necessary to indicate how the error occurred. It must be pointed out that the claimant party’s appeal does not respect the technique that must prevail in this type of challenge; they cannot expect their claims to be analyzed with simple manifestations of what they consider to be defenselessness and lack of reasoning, without delving into the grounds, as if it were an appeal; and even less so that all those issues be reviewed, without explaining in detail how the harm occurred. That is, without having analyzed in detail why they are harmed and how the non-observance of the procedural rule occurred. Thus, in the first ground, they neither explain nor identify which part or considerations of the judgment they could not contest, which facts or arguments of the Judges caused them that defenselessness; which is also not understood or is contradictory, when they clearly and broadly set forth their grievance for improper application and interpretation of those rules 340 of the LGAP and 98 of the LOA. In other words, they do not explain what the grievance consists of in light of the considerations of the judgment. On the contrary, what they seem to expose is a lack of reasoning, but they err in technique, as they pigeonhole the ground only as defenselessness. Likewise, although in the second claim they allege lack of reasoning for reasons similar to the first, they again omit to indicate what the grievance consists of. That is, they fail to identify and analyze how the grievance occurred or what harm is caused to them, an indispensable requirement for the cited procedural claim to proceed. It should be remembered, it is their duty to describe in an orderly and clear manner the grievances that are of their interest, since this Chamber does not have the procedural duty to decipher and sometimes interpret what the allegation raised is. The technique used is not correct and lacks a clear and direct explanation regarding the violation of the procedural rule. Having said the foregoing, it is inferred that both reproaches are fully informal, because this Tribunal considers that a correct cassational praxis is not followed. The appellant forgets that it is not sufficient to express a series of general and merely argumentative disagreements, as it is necessary, as has been said, to contrast what was decided with the general violation that, in their view, took place in accordance with the grounds expressly regulated in the CPCA. Consequently, the claims regarding these criticisms are informal, and therefore must be rejected outright.\n\nPOR TANTO\n\nIn the terms set forth, the cassation appeal filed by QUÍMICOS HOLANDA COSTA RICA S.A. is admitted, except for the grievances for violation of procedural rules, which are rejected outright. The appeal is transferred to the ESTADO for a period of 10 business days counted from the notification of this order.\n\n| Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga |\n| --- | --- |\n| Román Solís Zelaya | Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández |\n\nJROSALES\nEXP: 15-000974-1027-CA\n\nTeléfonos: (506) 2295-3658 o 2295-3659, correo electrónico sala_primera@poder-judicial.go.cr"
}